| The administrative control model adopted for land use in China has serious malfunction in its universal cost of the control, including the rent-seeking cost, the internal cost, the information cost and the enforcement cost. Additionally, the special situation of our land system during the transition period also boosts the possibility and extent of the efficiency loss of the control. Thus the reform of the regulative model for land use is of great urgency. The incentive regulation is the international mainstream as the alternative to the traditional administrative control, whose institutional samples include the control of total amount and the flexible regulation, community empowerment and planning agreements, etc. The validity of the incentive regulation of land use bases on the breakthrough of the legal principle about the land use plan by theories as the theory of uncertainty, the theory of the planning right and the theory of regulation and negotiation. The essence of the incentive regulation is the self-regulation of the private which imitates the market mechanism. The incentive regulation functionally reconstructs the legal relationship of the regulation, transforms the vertical control into equal relationship, promotes the legal position of the private party in administration, yields a win-win result, and controls the cost of the administrative regulation. The reform of the land use control in China should learn form the incentive regulation of land use, change the legislative idea of land use control, establish the legal boundary between the market mechanism and the administrative intervention, and insert rationally the private law norms into related legislations. |
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