In recent years, local judicial organs in China have been very enthusiastic about pilot reform on the criminal procedure system. There are mainly three motive forces behind such reforms: insufficient supply of effective institution, strong incentives for career accomplishment, and desire to rebuild the credibility of the criminal justice system. These pilot reforms are also promoted by such supportive factors as the imperfection of the Criminal Procedure Law itself, the increased independence and autonomy of local judicial organs, and the historical background of the political "correctness" and legitimacy of judicial reform. Whether aimed at improving the existing system or creating new systems, these reforms have some common inherent characteristics and embody the unique features of the operation of the judicial administration system as well as of the judicial system in China. Their greatest value is to serve as a "laboratory" for a national-level reform on the criminal procedure system. An analysis from the perspective of operational techniques reveals many problems in these local pilot reforms, such as the lack of standard rules for implementation, of scientific evaluation of results, of neutrality on the part of reform leaders, of ethical constraints, and of overall coordination and supervision. We should take a value-neutral stance towards these pilot reforms, recognize their value of promoting the transformation of the criminal procedure system while, at the same time, be aware of their problems at the level of operational techniques, and try to find appropriate solutions to these problems. |