| In response to the wave of acquisitions in the platform economy, strengthening antitrust review of acquisitions is gradually becoming a regulatory consensus both in China and globally. There are application limitations in the theoretical foundation of predatory acquisitions aimed at eliminating potential competition or innovation and the resulting innovation-killing zones that inhibit investment and financing. As an effective mechanism in the innovation research and commercialization processes of platform markets, acquisitions can achieve scale economies, incentivize venture capital, and generate innovation multiplier effects. Both China and foreign jurisdictions have implemented reform measures for startup acquisitions, including amending declaration standards, establishing no-threshold declaration obligations, enhancing post-investigation, and shifting the burden of proof. These measures will dampen the monetization of the risk capital market, increase unnecessary costs of acquisition review, and weaken business certainty. The reform policies for reviewing startup acquisitions should be restrained to a certain extent by such measures as abandoning specialized declaration standards, clarifying innovation competition harm, and maintaining the allocation of the burden of proof. Meanwhile, it is also necessary to adjust the existing regulatory framework in light of the characteristics of platform acquisitions, strengthen the review of exclusive behaviors, establish a two-stage competition review, refine behavioral remedies, and clarify post-investigation rules. |
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