法学研究

文章摘要

资本多数决原则与控制股东的诚信义务

DOI：

英文关键词: controlling shareholders;majority rule principle;fiduciary duty

基金项目:

作者	单位
朱慈蕴	清华大学法学院

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中文摘要:

以上市公司“一股独大”为背景考察控制股东滥用控制权问题，其制度原因在于，作为资本企业集中股东意志的必然选择资本多数决原则，本身却也存在着制度上的缺陷，从而导致其在公司实践中产生异化。为了矫正控制权滥用而导致的控制股东与中小股东的利益失衡，应当要求控制股东行使控制权时承担诚信义务，并通过具体制度架构确保其诚信义务的履行。

英文摘要:

The article examines the problem caused by sole majority shareholders, with particular reference to exploitative actions by controlling shareholders in Chinese listed companies. While acknowledging the inevitability of the majority rule principle, the article discusses its defects inherent in the institution,which lead the potential for its manipulation in practice. To rectify such abuses, which bring the result of the unbalance between controlling shareholders and little shareholders, it is necessary to develop the fiduciary duty for controlling shareholders, and to guarantee its performance by specific institutions established.

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