| The current international monetary system with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at the core historically originated from the political compromise between major powers, more specifically, between the U.S.and the U.K.This has left the system with inborn deficiencies in terms of effectiveness and enforceability. Moreover, with the evolution of the world economy, developing countries, especially those dynamic emerging markets such as the BRICs, have come to challenge the representativeness of this system dominated by wealthy developed countries. The unexpected global financial crisis further disclosed the underlying problems of the existing system. From the viewpoint of China as an unique actor in the IMF, the author summarizes the major problems IMF faces today, i.e., strayed institutional role, one-sided policy supervision, imbalanced governance structure, and paralyzed dispute resolution. To cope with these problems, some reform measures have already been taken or on the way, but they are inadequate for a meaningful change of the status quo. The author argues that further efforts should be made in terms of reshaping the institutional role, strengthening bilateral supervision, improving governance structure and promoting dispute resolution. The dual goal of the reform should be on the one hand to readjust the functions of the IMF, in order to enhance the effectiveness of its operation, and on the other hand to rebalance its power structure, so as to promote the democratization of its governance.Given that any reform can only be realized by means of revising the relevant legal instruments, and given that the revision of the Articles of Agreement themselves is extremely difficult, the author suggests to begin with lower instruments such as Rules, Regulations and Decisions, and make fuller use of the interpretation power conferred on the Board of Governors and the Executive Board by the Articles of Agreement. |
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