In China, the practice of law enforcement agencies of land has presented a phenomenon of swing, in which sometimes law enforcement leads to effective result, sometimes results in failure. The swing-type enforcement cannot be entirely attributed to the incompleteness of law or the limited capacity of law enforcement agencies as most studies have argued, but also is due to the embedded law enforcement under the centralized political and administrative system. Embedded law enforcement means that, law enforcement agencies of land have been embedded in the centralized political and administrative system, along with the central tasks constructed by the centralized system. According to the request of the centralized political and administrative system, all the law enforcement agencies must help to finish the central tasks. Thus it produces goal displacement, in which the goals of law enforcement agencies are set behind, whereas the centralized system's general goals are to be completed instead. On the other hand, to realize the goals with different nature rapidly, the central tasks must be accomplished by the mechanism of movement, which will still induce a swing effect of the law enforcement on land. Also, the differentiation of the centralized system itself, which means the local government focuses on different goals comparing to the central government, will further deepen the unpredictability of the effect of law enforcement on land.The notion of embedded law enforcement can integrate organically the construct constraint in state's macro-level and the practical operation in local's micro-level, show vividly the conflicts and selections of different logic in the course of enforcement, thus explain series of contradictory phenomena in the same framework. |