The control of the state power of criminal punishment is also a subject of constitutional law study. Therefore, it is necessary to put the criminal law doctrine under the scrutiny by constitutional law dogmatics. This article focuses on the relationship between criminal policies and the criminal legal system. On the one hand, the separation between the two (the Liszt Divide) is of constitutional significance:it restricts state power and protects human rights. It represents, in essence, the adherence to the rule of law in its formal sense. On the other hand, criminal policies are not necessarily outside the positive legal system; rather, they should draw their essence from the constitution. The constitutionalization of criminal policies reduces their vagueness, eases their impact on the positive legal system, and reinforces their function of criticizing the legislation. It is necessary to construct a conception of legal interest, which is related to the constitution and revolves around fundamental rights, to perform the function of interpreting and criticizing the criminal law. The adjustments of the penal system through policies should be subjected to review based on the principle of proportionality. In this way, the analysis by the criminal law doctrine of the controversies resulting from the Ninth Amendment to the Criminal Law, such as those concerning the establishment of the crime of disrupting the work order of a state organ and the application of life imprisonment to the crime of corruption, can be reinforced and responded to by the constitutional law dogmatics. Many criminal law issues, such as the interpretation of the constitutionality of criminal law, the relationship between risk criminal law and missions of the state, and the clarity of criminal law and legislators' room of discretion, need to be solve through the communication between constitutional and criminal legal doctrines. These two disciplines jointly perform the task of ensuring the constitutionality of criminal law. |