| Environmental liability insurance is seen as a stand-alone tool for addressing environmental risks. It has institutional advantages over first-party insurance under the circumstance of environmental risks and should be regarded as a priority among insurance tools. However, the conclusion based on the Shaver model that the market mechanism can usually reach the optimal effect of liability insurance spontaneously cannot be proved under the circumstance of abstract environmental risk and specific national conditions. As a result, the compulsory insurance model becomes inevitable. The realization of the value of the insurance system is externally determined by the insurer's capability for recognizing, controlling and underwriting environmental risks and internally limited by the validity of the insurance coverage design. In the former case, insurers can integrate their own risk assessment and control activities into the national environmental management system, clarify as far as possible the forms of and responsibilities for several environmental infringements, utilize the mechanism for the redistribution of responsibilities within joint and several liability, and construct a dual risk premium system to reinforce their own risk assessment capabilities and reduce the uncertainty of responsibility arising from legislative and judicial factors. In the latter case, the scope of coverage should be carefully designed to include pure economic loss and the damage to the environment itself. At the same time, the insurer's affordability can be taken care of by way of controlling the scope of the insured. |
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