| When using robo-advisors, the traditional legal framework, which mainly takes financial professionals as its regulatory targets, is impractical and ineffective in regulating robo-advisors, which have no independent legal personality, thus leading to such problems as non-enforcement, the nihilization of obligors and the failure of the existing system of duties. To deal with this dilemma, lawmakers need to restructure the obligor's identification mechanism and the duty system. To be specific, the robo-advisors are the long-arms of the operators (the investment advisory institutions), outreaching for business; therefore, the operators and the person monitoring robo-advisors should be identified as the trustees by law and undertake the fiduciary duty and compliance duty accordingly. The design and manufacture of robo-advisors is actually a process of pre-processing the advisory action into algorithm, a simulation of the natural person's investment advisory behavior. The duties of the programmers should be distinguished from those of financial professionals who provide transaction and decision models for intelligent agents. The former should be identified as assistants to investment advisors, who do not bear the advisors' obligations, while the latter should be identified as the investment advisors by law, who should fulfill the advisors' duties. The substance of the duties of the robo-advisor mode needs to penetrate through the complex veil and reach the algorithmic level to reflect their essential characteristics. The basic principle to be followed by the new regulatory paradigm is to fully embrace new developments of artificial intelligence, so as to prevent the absence of accountabilities resulting from the evasion and reduction of duties by algorithm black box, while at the same time avoid overburdening the obligors. |
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