| The indicator of “protecting minority investors” in the World Bank Doing Business Report is based on the textual regulation of affiliated transactions of listed corporations in every economy entity. Its case hypothesis contains such presuppositions as independence of corporate form, harmfulness of affiliated transactions, stricter regulation of the better law and dominance of private law enforcement. The indicator constitutes a “World Bank paradigm of the regulation of affiliated transaction” with its own value tendency. However, its simple case hypothesis is far from being able to reflect the objective market situation, its understanding on the structure and function of affiliated transactions is biased, its regulatory method ignores the overall coordination among different legal means, and its evaluation results can not reflect the legal operational practice and regulatory effect. Drawing lessons from the World Bank paradigm, we can find the same limitation of perspective and institutional deficiencies in the current Chinese legislation. In response to the development of market situation and practical needs, China should transform its affiliated transaction regulation paradigm from the current behavioral regulation paradigm, which is based on the independent company perspective, to the structural and behavioral regulation paradigm, which is based on the corporate group perspective. In the reconstruction of the paradigm, China should take the coordination between behavior law and organization law as the basis, focus on the regulatory function of the balancing of interests, promote multiple legal mechanisms simultaneously, and pay equivalent attention on public and private law enforcement. |
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