The prevailing doctrine of legal methodology distinguishes between legal interpretation and legal renewal, and has taken “the possible semantic meaning” as the distinguishing criterion for a long time. With the development of meaning theory and the deepening of the study of legal interpretation, more and more scholars have realized the shortcomings of this criterion and proposed some new ones. But these new criteria are not satisfactory, for they either have an inappropriate extension, and thus encounter counterexamples, or lack of generality and/or clarity, and thus can’t effectively distinguish between renewal and interpretation. A proper criterion should be neutral to different positions of legal interpretation, so that various values related to the rule of law may have the opportunity to participate in the weighing process of legal interpretation. Based on reflections on criteria that have been proposed, a composite criterion can be advanced: an activity that explores the meaning of a legal text is interpretation, if and only if: (1) it is an activity that explores the conventional meaning, the speakers’ meaning, or the true meaning of the legal text; or (2) when conventional meaning does not exist in particular cases, it is an activity to explore the reasonable meaning of the legal text. |