| The disputes over the nature of a natural person’s capacity for rights is mainly manifested in the debate between the following two different theories. One claims that the capacity for rights is transcendental and equal, and cannot be abandoned and deprived, while the other claims that the capacity for rights is granted by national legislation, which is unequal and can be abandoned and deprived. The latter is incorrect because it not only contains the danger of taking the granting and depriving of the capacity for rights as the governing tool, but also misunderstands the concept of the capacity for rights, confuses norms and facts, confuses the capacity for rights and rights, and cuts the linkage between the norms of the capacity for rights and the ethics on which they are based. A “specific right capacity” such as the “marriage capacity”, is not the capacity for rights, but a capacity for liberty as reflected by the setting of qualifications for a specific act. The system of rights capacity is only responsible for the distribution of legal subject qualifications, but does not solve the problems of the availability of rights and the conditions for exercising rights. The latter two issues are the issues of right distribution, which need to apply the consideration of the adaptability of rights and the consideration of the conditions for exercising rights. In addition to the three characteristics advocated by the first theory, the capacity for rights of a natural person is also characterized by indivisibility, normativeness and potentiality. |
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