法学研究

文章摘要

公司挤出合并下异议股东回购请求权的功能定位

Appraisal Remedy for Dissenting Shareholders in Squeeze-Out Mergers

DOI：

英文关键词: squeeze-out merger; cash merger; short-form merger; dissenting shareholders; appraisal right

基金项目:

作者	单位
耿利航	中国政法大学民商经济法学院

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中文摘要:

当少数股东不同意合并时,可以行使异议股东回购请求权“强卖”股份给公司,而公司多数股东(控制人)也应有权以现金为对价“强买”拒绝退出的少数股份,实现挤出少数股东的目的,二者应是一体发展的制度安排。简易合并本质上就是现金挤出合并,其初衷并非单纯地简化公司合并的决策程序。在挤出合并下,异议股东回购请求权之功能应从给予异议股东退出公司的机会,转变为通过评估股份公允价值来保护少数股东利益、抑制公司控制人机会主义的主要制度工具。为保护少数股东以及防止滥诉,应在完善异议股东回购请求权救济程序的基础上,综合考虑股价的有效性、公众股东的接受度、交易程序的完善性等具体情况,形成能够认定股份公允价值的明确的、具有可预见性的司法裁判规则。

英文摘要:

When minority shareholders dissent from a merger, they can exercise their appraisal right to “force-sell” their shares to the company. Meanwhile, the majority shareholders（controllers） should also have the right to “force-buy” the dissenting shares at a cash price, achieving the purpose of squeezing out the minority shareholders. These two mechanisms should develop as an integrated system. Short-form mergers are essentially cash-out mergers, and their primary intent is not simply to streamline the decision-making process for mergers. In a squeeze-out merger, the function of the dissenting shareholder appraisal right should shift from providing the opportunity for dissenting shareholders to exit the company,to becoming the main institutional tool for protecting minority shareholders’ interests and curbing the controlling shareholders’ opportunism by evaluating the fair value of shares. To protect minority shareholders and prevent abusive litigation, it is necessary to improve the remedy process of the appraisal right, comprehensively consider the effectiveness of share prices, the acceptability by public shareholders, and the completeness of the transaction process, and establish a clear and foreseeable judicial ruling framework for determining the fair value of shares.

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